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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
                                                 

 The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States Senior 
District Judge for the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 
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In 1986, David Munchinski was convicted of two 
counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of 
second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders 
that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania (the 
“Bear Rocks Murders” or the “murders”).  In the years 
following his conviction, Munchinski discovered that 
prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a 
dozen articles of exculpatory evidence.  After 
unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief 
several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed 
a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2244 & 2254(d) in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  
Munchinski argued that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), when it declined to grant Munchinski post-
conviction relief based on several articles of exculpatory 
evidence that were unlawfully withheld by the 
prosecution.   
The District Court found some of Munchinski‟s 
claims untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), but 
equitably tolled the statute of limitations for a subset of 
those claims.  The District Court next concluded that 
Munchinski had procedurally defaulted certain claims.  
The District Court excused his procedural default, 
finding that applying the procedural default doctrine to 
Munchinski‟s petition would effect a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.  Finally, the District Court agreed 
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with Munchinski that the state court had unreasonably 
applied Brady.  The District Court granted Munchinski‟s 
petition.   
Warden Harry Wilson and the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General (collectively, the “Commonwealth”) 
appeal from the District Court‟s judgment.  The 
Commonwealth concedes that it cannot “make a 
compelling argument” that the Superior Court properly 
applied Brady given the nature of the evidence that was 
withheld.  Oral Arg. Tr. 4:8-9.  We agree.  The scope of 
the Brady violations here is staggering, and the Superior 
Court failed to appreciate the aggregate impact of the 
withheld evidence.   
In apparent recognition of that reality, the 
Commonwealth limits its appeal to three issues:  (1) 
whether the District Court erred by equitably tolling the 
statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1)(D); (2) whether the 
District Court erred by excusing Munchinski‟s supposed 
procedural default on the basis of a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice; and (3) whether Munchinski has 
produced sufficient evidence “to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).   
We conclude: (1) that the District Court 
appropriately tolled the statute of limitations; (2) that 
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Munchinski did not procedurally default his claims; and 
(3) that Munchinski has demonstrated his actual 
innocence by clear and convincing evidence, as is 
required by § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).  “Section 2254(d) 
reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against 
extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice 
systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction 
through appeal.”  Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 
S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Like the District Court, we see precisely such 
an “extreme malfunction[ ]” in this case.  Consequently, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court granting 
Munchinski a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
§ 2254(d)(1). 
I. 
On December 2, 1977, Pennsylvania State Police 
found the bodies of two men in and around a cabin 
owned by Raymond Gierke in Bear Rocks, located in 
Fayette County, Pennsylvania.
1
  These two bodies were 
later identified as those of Gierke and James Peter 
Alford. 
                                                 
1
 The parties have not produced the trial testimony and 
other evidence that was actually presented at trial.  We 
take the facts as recited by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court in its adjudication of Munchinski‟s state court 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
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 The police notified Fayette County Deputy 
Coroner Jack Powell, who transported the bodies from 
the crime scene in order to conduct autopsies.  Autopsies 
were conducted that same day by pathologist Dr. Sava 
Radisavljevic (“Dr. Sava”).  On December 9, 1977, Dr. 
Sava delivered his autopsy report to the Fayette County 
Coroner‟s Office.  A week later, he delivered addenda to 
his report.
2
  The report and the addenda made clear that 
Gierke and Alford were shot multiple times at close 
range and died from their gunshot wounds.  The report 
and addenda also suggested that both Gierke and Alford 
had been anally raped prior to the murders.   
 The Pennsylvania State Police assigned Trooper 
Montgomery Goodwin as the lead investigating officer in 
the case.  Trooper Goodwin worked with Corporal 
Robert Mangiacarne over the course of the next five 
years investigating the murders.  Though Trooper 
Goodwin and Corporal Mangiacarne identified several 
suspects, they lacked sufficient evidence to file charges 
until 1982. 
A. 
 At some point within the period of 1980 and 1981, 
Richard Bowen, a convicted burglar and forger 
incarcerated in state prison in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, 
                                                 
2
 Dr. Sava died on December 19, 1977, two days after the 
addenda were delivered to the coroner‟s office. 
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contacted the Pennsylvania State Police claiming 
knowledge of the Bear Rocks Murders.  The precise 
dates of the conversations between Bowen and the police 
remain unknown and the exact nature of those 
conversations remains unclear.  What is certain is that 
Bowen‟s statements were inconsistent and contradictory.  
Two of these inconsistencies are most remarkable for our 
purposes:  (1) Bowen initially implicated only Leon 
Scaglione, the man who was eventually tried and 
convicted along with Munchinski; and (2) Bowen at first 
stated that he did not enter Gierke‟s home during the 
shootings and did not directly witness the murders. 
There were numerous changes in Bowen‟s account 
of the murders; at some point Bowen‟s story changed 
such that he was a direct witness to the shootings, which 
he claimed were committed by Scaglione as well as 
Munchinski in a drug-related dispute.
3
  On October 22, 
1982, Munchinski and Scaglione were charged with two 
counts of criminal homicide in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 2501(a), and two counts of criminal 
conspiracy to commit homicide in violation of 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 903. 
 Munchinski and Scaglione were tried jointly in 
                                                 
3
 Even this fact was not consistent in Bowen‟s various 
accounts.  Initially, Bowen claimed that the murders were 
“a contract hit, [and] that a doctor or a lawyer paid 
him[.]”  Munchinski App‟x 197. 
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April 1983 (the “First Trial”).  At this trial, the 
Commonwealth relied principally on Bowen‟s purported 
eyewitness testimony.  Bowen testified that he directly 
witnessed Munchinski and Scaglione commit the 
murders.  Specifically, Bowen testified that Gierke and 
Alford were raped by Scaglione and Munchinski, 
respectively, and that the two victims were murdered 
almost immediately thereafter.  Bowen‟s trial testimony 
was markedly different from the stories he reportedly 
told police when he first approached them as a potential 
witness.  Bowen‟s testimony was also at odds with 
certain facts that were elicited at trial.  For example, 
Bowen claimed that he drove Scaglione and Munchinski 
to the site of the murders in Scaglione‟s lime green Ford 
Gran Torino.  Scaglione, however, did not purchase that 
Gran Torino until almost six months after the murders. 
The Commonwealth also presented testimony from 
Lori Lexa and Deborah Sue Dahlmann.  Lexa and 
Dahlmann, acquaintances well before their involvement 
in this case, claimed that Munchinski and Scaglione were 
with them in a bar in January 1978, and that Munchinski 
and Scaglione admitted to committing the murders.  
Dahlmann‟s ex-husband Ed Wiltrout, however, was a 
prime suspect in the Bear Rocks murders; unbeknownst 
to Munchinski, at least one witness claimed to police that 
Wiltrout was one of the shooters.  Munchinski was 
unable at trial to cross-examine Dahlmann with the 
witness statement implicating Wiltrout because the report 
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documenting that statement had not been produced.  The 
Commonwealth relied exclusively on testimony from 
Bowen, Lexa, and Dahlmann to link Munchinski to the 
crime, presenting no physical evidence linked to 
Munchinski. 
 On April 12, 1983, the First Trial ended with a 
hung jury and the declaration of a mistrial.  The 
Commonwealth dropped the conspiracy charges against 
Munchinski and severed Munchinski‟s case from 
Scaglione‟s case.  In October 1986, the Commonwealth 
retried Scaglione.  During his trial, Scaglione admitted to 
committing the murders.  Scaglione testified that 
Munchinski had no involvement in the murders, but that 
Scaglione had committed the crimes with an associate 
named Homer Stewart who allegedly resembled 
Munchinski.  Scaglione was convicted of two counts of 
first degree homicide and two counts of second degree 
homicide. 
 In November 1986, the Commonwealth retried 
Munchinski (the “Retrial”).  The Commonwealth‟s case 
still consisted solely of witness testimony allegedly 
linking Munchinski to the murders.   The Commonwealth 
again elicited testimony from Bowen, Lexa, and 
Dahlmann, which was largely consistent with their 
testimony from the First Trial.   The Commonwealth also 
introduced testimony from two additional sources:  (1) 
Bernard Furr, another acquaintance of Dahlmann‟s, who 
repeated a story very similar to Dahlmann‟s about an 
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alleged confession in January 1978; and (2) Harold 
Thomas, who testified that Munchinski confessed while 
in jail in 1983. 
During the Retrial, Munchinski sought to introduce 
Scaglione‟s testimony from his October 1986 retrial, 
where he implicated Stewart and exonerated Munchinski.  
Scaglione declined to testify, invoking his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.  Munchinski 
requested that the court grant Scaglione use immunity, 
but the court refused.  Additionally, the trial court ruled 
that Scaglione‟s prior testimony was inadmissible under 
Pennsylvania law.  As a result, Munchinski was unable to 
introduce any exculpatory testimony from Scaglione.   
In his closing arguments, then-Assistant District 
Attorney Ralph Warman stated to the jury:  “did you hear 
anyone testify that Bowen received anything other than 
immunity?  No . . . does that bolster his testimony to 
indicate that Bowen was there?”  Munchinski App‟x 42.  
This argument misled the jury.  Unbeknownst to the jury 
and Munchinski, prosecutors in Fayette County had 
reached a leniency agreement with Bowen, whereby 
prosecutors in Westmoreland County would act leniently 
against Bowen in his ongoing parole revocation hearings 
in exchange for Bowen‟s testimony against Munchinski.  
The Commonwealth failed to turn over to Munchinski 
documents evidencing this leniency agreement. 
Munchinski was found guilty of two counts of 
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first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree 
homicide.  On June 15, 1987, Munchinski was sentenced 
to two consecutive life sentences, one for each of the first 
degree murder convictions.  Munchinski received no 
additional penalties for the two second degree 
convictions.
4
 
On July 14, 1987, Munchinski appealed from the 
judgment of sentence.  On November 30, 1990, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.  Commonwealth 
v. Munchinski, 585 A.2d 471, 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).  
Munchinski then sought allocatur from the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court.  That court denied review on November 
13, 1991. 
B. 
 In November 1991, while imprisoned in 
Oklahoma, Bowen asked to speak with the Federal 
                                                 
4
 Munchinski argued on appeal that his convictions were 
multiplicitous, and that he could not be convicted of two 
counts of first degree murder and two counts of second 
degree murder in connection with Gierke‟s and Alford‟s 
murders.  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
held that by declining to impose an additional sentence 
for the second degree murder convictions, the trial court 
had effectively merged the first degree and second degree 
counts for each of the two murders.  See Commonwealth 
v. Munchinski, 585 A.2d 471, 479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) about the Bear Rocks 
Murders.  Bowen was soon contacted by FBI Special 
Agent Matthew Schneck.  In talking with Agent Schneck, 
Bowen recanted his trial testimony, saying that “he was 
not involved in any fashion with Scaglione or 
Munchinski in the . . . killings of Alford and Gierke.”  
Munchinski App‟x 42.   
Munchinski was soon made aware of Bowen‟s 
statement to Special Agent Schneck.  On April 4, 1992, 
in response to Bowen‟s recantation, Munchinski deposed 
Bowen.  Bowen testified that he fabricated his trial 
testimony, and admitted that he was not in Pennsylvania 
on the night of the murders.  Bowen claimed that police 
and prosecutors had threatened him.  If he did not testify 
against Munchinski and Scaglione, Bowen said, “they 
would have someone come along and say that they were 
present and that I had done the shootings.”  Bowen Dep. 
13:7-9.  Bowen maintained that Scaglione admitted to 
committing the murders, but that Scaglione “never did 
mention [Munchinski‟s] name.”  Id. at 21:15.   
Bowen also explained why his fabricated account 
of the murders changed over time.  Specifically, he 
testified that he would rehearse his story with Trooper 
Goodwin, and that Goodwin would give him instructions: 
A: [Trooper Goodwin] asked me about 
the story, and I went over it, you 
know, a couple different times.  And 
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then, he started with “No, this is what 
happened”--you know--“and we have 
witnesses to verify this.”  And, he 
started in with the [sic] I was driving 
the car and I told him, you know 
“[y]ou‟re crazy.  You people can‟t 
prove none [sic] of this.”  “We got 
witnesses.”  And then, he started with 
a--he pulled a warrant out of hand--I 
never did see if it was signed or what 
it said--but he was reading on that 
where all he had to do is sign my 
name and I would be charged in the 
murder. 
* * * 
Q: And, whenever this occurred, did 
Trooper Goodwin tell you that he 
wanted you to give him a different 
story? 
A: He told me the story, and then he said 
if I didn‟t go along with that, then I 
would be charged in the homicide. 
Id. at 23:11-22, 24:4-9.  Notably, Trooper Goodwin was 
responsible for the change between Bowen‟s first 
account, when he claimed that he remained in the car, to 
his later accounts, when he claimed that he went into the 
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cabin and directly witnessed the murders.
5
  Bowen 
claimed that he changed this part of his story because 
Trooper Goodwin “said that they had to have [him] in the 
house.”  Id. at 61:16-17. 
Bowen further testified about how he prepared for 
trial with former District Attorney Gerald Solomon, the 
lead prosecutor during the First Trial: 
Q: And, did [Solomon] tell you what to 
say? 
A: Yes. 
 
Q: Did you tell him that you were not 
present at the killings? 
A: He knew I wasn‟t.  Yes, I told him 
                                                 
5
 In 1988, years after Munchinski‟s arrest, Trooper 
Goodwin was convicted of third-degree murder of a man 
who was seen dancing with his wife.  See Munchinski 
App‟x 44.  Trooper Goodwin was sentenced to a 10-20 
year prison sentence, and was ultimately released on 
parole in 2008, after serving nearly 20 years in prison.  
See id.; Former State Trooper Out of Prison, Tribune 
Democrat, May 23, 2008, available at http://tribune-
democrat.com/local/x519164954/Former-state-trooper-
out-of-prison/print (last visited August 30, 2012). 
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that.  I said, I--it was just a “I can‟t do 
this, man.  This ain‟t right.”  And, 
it‟s--you know “[t]his is done all the 
time.  We know they did it.  We just--
we have to put somebody there to say 
they seen them.” 
Q: And, that‟s what he told you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And, he knew that you weren‟t there? 
A: Yes, he did. 
Id. at 42:7-20. 
 Finally, Bowen described how he came to know so 
many details about the murders.  He explained that 
Trooper Goodwin showed him several photos of the 
crime scene, and even took him to the scene and pointed 
out where the bodies were found.  Bowen also confirmed 
that Trooper Goodwin gave him details about Scaglione‟s 
lime green Gran Torino, and pressed him to include that 
information in his testimony; apparently neither of them 
was aware that Scaglione had not purchased his lime 
green Gran Torino until well after the murders. 
On April 16, 1992, only a few weeks after 
Bowen‟s deposition, Munchinski filed his first petition 
for relief under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief 
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Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541, et seq. 
(the “PCRA I” petition).  The PCRA I petition sought 
relief based on two articles of newly-discovered 
evidence:  (1) a September 1982 report from Trooper 
Goodwin (the “Goodwin Report”) that was intentionally 
edited to conceal a reference to a recorded statement 
made by Bowen; and (2) Bowen‟s sworn deposition 
testimony.  PCRA petitions are generally assigned to the 
judge who presided over a petitioner‟s trial.  In this case, 
however, the judge who had presided over the First Trial 
and the Retrial had retired from the bench, so the PCRA I 
petition was assigned to Judge William J. Franks of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County.   
 Judge Franks held an evidentiary hearing 
concerning both of Munchinski‟s evidentiary claims.  
Former prosecutors Solomon and Warman testified at the 
hearing about the Goodwin Report.  Warman, the 
Commonwealth‟s lead prosecutor during the Retrial, 
admitted that he intentionally edited the Goodwin Report 
to remove a paragraph referencing a recorded statement 
from Bowen, and spliced together the paragraphs before 
and after the removed text in order to conceal the 
removal.  Warman testified that he intentionally removed 
the relevant paragraph because no statement from Bowen 
was ever transcribed or recorded and that the reference 
would be “misleading.”  Solomon, who was Warman‟s 
supervisor during the Retrial, corroborated Warman‟s 
testimony. 
 17 
 
 Judge Franks credited Warman‟s and Solomon‟s 
account, finding that Bowen‟s statement was never 
recorded.  Nonetheless, troubled by Warman‟s 
intentional modification of the Goodwin Report, Judge 
Franks ordered an in camera review of all of the 
Pennsylvania State Police investigative files related to the 
Bear Rocks Murders, including several additional files 
relating to Bowen.  Judge Franks ordered the 
Commonwealth to turn over all documents that he 
deemed discoverable.  The Commonwealth, however, 
failed to turn over several critical articles of evidence to 
the PCRA I court for its in camera review, rendering that 
review incomplete. 
As to Bowen‟s deposition testimony, Munchinski 
called Bowen to testify and recant his trial testimony.  
Bowen, however, invoked his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.  Judge Franks granted Bowen 
use immunity for his testimony.  At the hearing, Bowen 
disavowed his deposition testimony and reaffirmed his 
testimony from the Retrial.
6
  Bowen subsequently 
                                                 
6
 In 1995, Munchinski filed a private criminal complaint 
against Bowen for perjury during his civil deposition.  
Munchinski‟s complaint was dismissed, however, on the 
ground that Judge Franks had granted Bowen use 
immunity for his testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  
See Commonwealth ex rel. Munchinski v. Bowen, No. 
1706 Pittsburgh 1995, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 
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committed suicide. 
Munchinski also adduced testimony from Kenneth 
Knight, an acquaintance of Bowen‟s from prison.  Knight 
testified that Bowen admitted that he was in Oklahoma at 
the time of the murders, and that he lied under oath 
during the Retrial.  Further, Knight testified that he had 
personally introduced Bowen to Scaglione and 
Munchinski in March 1978, long after the Bear Rocks 
Murders, when all four of them were incarcerated 
together in Westmoreland County Jail. 
On August 5, 1993, based on the limited Brady 
violations that were known and alleged at the time, Judge 
Franks dismissed Munchinski‟s PCRA I petition.  
Munchinski appealed this decision.  On December 11, 
1995, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the PCRA I petition.    Munchinski sought 
review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  That Court 
denied allocatur on August 30, 1996. 
                                                                                                             
16, 1996) (unpublished memorandum).  Judge Feudale, 
who presided over the PCRA III proceedings, found this 
troubling—the prosecution apparently threatened Bowen 
with perjury charges if he did not retract his recantation, 
but then Bowen was granted use immunity, and 
protection from any resulting perjury charges, if he 
reaffirmed his prior testimony.  Although we understand 
Judge Feudale‟s concern, it has no bearing on the issues 
before us now. 
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On January 6, 1998, Munchinski filed his first 
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  The United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed the petition as untimely on 
September 30, 1998.  Munchinski appealed the dismissal 
of his petition to this court (the “Appeal”). 
On May 12, 2000, while the Appeal was pending 
before this court, Munchinski filed a second PCRA 
petition pro se.  That petition raised additional Brady 
claims based on allegedly withheld evidence that 
Munchinski discovered while his first federal habeas 
petition was pending.  Six days later, on May 18, 2000, 
that pro se petition was dismissed because Munchinski 
was still represented by counsel.  On July 27, 2000, 
Munchinski refiled his petition through counsel (the 
“PCRA II” petition). 
The PCRA II court never reached the merits of 
Munchinski‟s Brady claims.  Rather, based on a 
misunderstanding of Pennsylvania law, Judge Franks 
erroneously concluded that the PCRA II court lacked 
jurisdiction over Munchinski‟s petition because the 
Appeal remained pending in federal court.  Judge Franks 
stated: 
After full review of the Petition and record, 
this Court finds that an appeal was filed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit and is still pending.  This 
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Court has no jurisdiction.  Defendant is not 
entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, 
and further proceedings would serve no 
legitimate purpose.  Pa. R. Crim. P. section 
1507(a). 
Order Dismissing PCRA II Pet., August 24, 2000, 
Munchinski v. Wilson, No. 07-cv-1712, ECF No. 21-12.
7
   
After disclaiming jurisdiction, Judge Franks stated 
that Munchinski could appeal within thirty days from the 
date of the court‟s order.  Perhaps knowing that the 
Appeal would be resolved imminently, Munchinski 
declined to appeal the PCRA II Court‟s decision.  
Instead, he heeded Judge Frank‟s implicit suggestion and 
waited to re-file his petition after the Appeal was 
decided, when the state court could properly exercise 
jurisdiction over his petition.  On January 24, 2001, we 
decided the Appeal, affirming the dismissal of 
                                                 
7
 On August 3, 2000, Judge Franks issued an order 
stating that the PCRA II court “ha[d] no jurisdiction” 
over the petition.  Order, August 24, 2000, Munchinski v. 
Wilson, No. 07-cv-1712, ECF No. 21-11.  This order did 
not formally dismiss Munchinski‟s petition, but noted 
that the court would dismiss his petition for lack of 
jurisdiction unless Munchinski could provide “an 
appropriate response.”  When no appropriate response 
was filed, Judge Franks dismissed Munchinski‟s petition 
on August 24, 2000. 
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Munchinski‟s first habeas petition.   
C. 
1. 
On March 21, 2001, less than sixty days after we 
decided the Appeal, Munchinski filed his third PCRA 
petition (the “PCRA III” petition).  In the interim, former 
prosecutors Warman and Solomon had each been 
elevated to the bench of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Fayette County.  This led all the sitting judges of the 
Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County to recuse 
themselves from the matter.  The Administrative Office 
of Pennsylvania Courts assigned the PCRA III Petition to 
Judge Barry Feudale of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Northumberland County.
8
  Additionally, because of 
allegations of misconduct made against First Assistant 
District Attorney John Kopas, who represented the 
Commonwealth during the PCRA I proceedings, the 
Commonwealth‟s case was taken over by the 
Pennsylvania Attorney General‟s Office. 
                                                 
8
 Judge Feudale was elected to the Court of Common 
Pleas of Northumberland County in 1987.  He became 
that court‟s President Judge in 1995, and took senior 
status in 1998.  In 2004, after issuing his opinion in this 
case, Judge Feudale was appointed as a visiting Senior 
Judge of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. 
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The PCRA III petition raised several Brady claims.  
Munchinski twice moved to amend that petition to 
include additional claims based on evidence he 
uncovered after filing the PCRA III petition.  Both of 
these motions were granted.  In sum, Munchinski raised 
Brady claims based on the following eleven articles of 
material exculpatory evidence that were allegedly 
suppressed by the Commonwealth, in addition to the 
Goodwin Report that was the subject of the PCRA I 
petition: 
1. Sava Addendum:  an addendum to Alford‟s 
autopsy report from Dr. Sava indicating that 
the semen sample taken from Alford‟s 
rectum was of blood type “A.”  Munchinski 
is of blood type “B.”9  Munchinski App‟x 
167. 
2. Parole Revocation Documents:  a set of 
documents related to Bowen‟s 1983 parole 
revocation hearings evidencing a previously-
undisclosed leniency agreement between 
                                                 
9
 Dr. Sava does note that cross-contamination from 
Alford‟s own semen could not “be entirely ruled out” 
based on the low number of spermatozoa found in 
Alford‟s rectum.  As the District Court noted, however, 
even if the collected sperm was from Alford, that fact by 
itself would cast further doubt on Bowen‟s testimony that 
Munchinski raped Alford. 
 23 
 
Bowen, the Westmoreland County District 
Attorney‟s Office, and the Fayette County 
District Attorney‟s Office.  Munchinski 
App‟x 168-71. 
3. Bates Report:  a January 7, 1978 report from 
Trooper George F. Bates discussing an 
interview with a witness who stated that 
Bowen had left Pennsylvania for Oklahoma 
on December 1, which, if referring to 
December 1, 1977, would have been the day 
before the murders.  Munchinski App‟x 158. 
4. Goodwin/Powell Report:  a December 20, 
1977 report from Goodwin in which Deputy 
Coroner Powell stated his belief that the anal 
intercourse to which Alford was subjected 
took place 24 hours prior to his death, 
thereby inconsistent with Bowen‟s account 
of the murders.  Commonwealth App‟x 218. 
5. Powell Addendum:  a typewritten summary 
of a phone call from Deputy Coroner Powell 
reaffirming his belief, recorded in the 
Goodwin/Powell Report, that Alford was 
subjected to anal intercourse “at least 24 
hours” prior to his murder.  Commonwealth 
App‟x 219. 
6. Mangiacarne/Carbone Report:  a December 
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16, 1980 report from Corporal Mangiacarne 
describing an interview with Elizabeth 
Carbone.  Carbone related a detailed 
confession given to her that implicated Ed 
Wiltrout, Commonwealth witness 
Dahlmann‟s ex-husband.  Commonwealth 
App‟x 220. 
7. Kinch Report:  a December 19, 1977 report 
from Trooper Robert Kinch describing nail 
scrapings and other biological evidence that 
had been taken from Alford.  The existence 
of this evidence was not disclosed to 
Munchinski before the First Trial or the 
Retrial.  Commonwealth App‟x 221. 
8. Dunkard/Proud Report:  a December 5, 1977 
report from Trooper Edward Dunkard 
relating a discussion with Delores Proud, a 
dispatcher for the Mount Pleasant, 
Pennsylvania Police Department.  
According to the report, Proud received a 
call at approximately 2:32 A.M. on 
December 2, 1977, from a telephone 
operator who allegedly received a call from 
Gierke claiming that he had been shot.  
Proud also received a call requesting an 
ambulance approximately 18 minutes after 
Gierke‟s call.  The call was from Bonnie 
Blackson, who had discovered Alford‟s 
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body.
10
  Commonwealth App‟x 223.  The 
timing of these calls was inconsistent with 
the account provided by Bowen. 
9. Veil/Mangello Report:  a June 23, 1986 
report from Trooper Richard Veil describing 
an interview with inmate Robert Lee 
Mangello, in which Mangello indicated that 
the Bear Rocks Murders were committed by 
Scaglione, Joseph Lucy, and a third, 
unnamed man.  Commonwealth App‟x 216. 
10. Madden/Lucy Report:  an October 15, 1986 
report from Trooper William F. Madden 
describing an interview with Lucy, in which 
Lucy denied Mangello‟s accusations.  Lucy 
claimed that Mangello himself was a direct 
witness of the Bear Rocks Murders.  
Commonwealth App‟x 217. 
                                                 
10
 Although the caller did not identify himself on the 
phone, blood found on the phone in Gierke‟s cabin was 
matched to Gierke‟s blood type.  The PCRA III Court 
and the District Court proceeded on the assumption that 
the call was placed by Gierke.  Based on that assumption, 
the timing of these calls could be said to conflict with the 
account provided by Bowen, who suggested at one point 
during trial that Gierke was shot in the head, which 
would of course make it unlikely that Gierke would make 
a later phone call. 
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11. Bates II Report:  a second copy of the Bates 
Report that was marked-up, allegedly by the 
Commonwealth.  Notably, the passage “and 
BOWEN left on the 1st of December” was 
highlighted.  Munchinski App‟x 159. 
Judge Feudale held several days of hearings on the 
PCRA III petition.  The parties presented testimony from 
Judge Franks, who had presided over the PCRA I 
petition.  Judge Franks testified that, had he been aware 
of the Bates Report, the Goodwin/Powell Report, and the 
Mangiacarne/Carbone Report (i.e., had Kopas produced 
the entire prosecution file as per his order, rather than 
intentionally withholding material evidence from his in 
camera review), he may well have granted relief on 
Munchinski‟s PCRA I petition.  See Munchinski App‟x 
112. 
Judge Feudale also heard testimony from Warman 
and Trooper Goodwin about the recorded statement 
referenced in the Goodwin Report, that the PCRA I court 
concluded did not exist.  Trooper Goodwin, who was at 
the time “serving a 10-20 year [prison] sentence for the 
murder of a man involved with his estranged wife,” 
Munchinski App‟x 44, testified that he personally 
observed Warman recording Bowen‟s statement on a tape 
recorder.  Goodwin confirmed that the whole purpose of 
speaking with Bowen was to get a recorded statement, 
noting that without a recording “[h]e could change his 
story.”  Munchinski App‟x 96.   
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Trooper Goodwin commented that he drafted his 
report the day after Bowen made his statement, and that 
his report was thus a timely recording of the discussion 
with Bowen.  Finally, Trooper Goodwin noted that his 
report, including the reference to the recording, was 
approved by his supervisor, who was also present when 
Bowen made his statement.  Trooper Goodwin noted that 
his supervisor would not have approved his report had 
such an important fact been incorrect. 
Warman maintained that Bowen‟s statement was 
never tape recorded.  Throughout the proceedings, 
Warman was openly hostile to questions.  When asked 
why he did not approach the Court before editing the 
Goodwin Report, he responded that “he didn‟t have to.”  
Munchinski App‟x 102.  When asked why he didn‟t 
obtain a written statement from Bowen, he replied:  
“Why would I want to do that?  That‟s a police job, not 
mine.”  Id. at 103.  When counsel suggested that a 
written statement may have been a good idea because 
Bowen could simply disappear before trial, Warman 
responded “[t]hat wouldn‟t be [his] problem”11 because 
                                                 
11
 Though the audio recording of the PCRA III 
proceedings was not produced to our court and has no 
bearing on the merits of the instant appeal, Judge Feudale 
noted that when Warman made this statement, “there was 
a collective and audible gasp from the crowded 
courtroom.”  Munchinski App‟x 103 n.3.  Judge Feudale 
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he was “not the investigator . . . .  We don‟t go out and do 
that kind [o]f thing.”  Id. at 103-04.  Warman admitted 
that if a police officer had altered the report, the officer 
might be guilty of tampering with evidence, but 
maintained that his conduct was permissible because he 
was a prosecutor, not a police officer.  Id. at 104.   
In addition to hearing testimony about the alleged 
recorded statement, Judge Feudale heard testimony from 
Kopas about his conduct during the PCRA I proceedings.  
Kopas acknowledged that he confirmed to the PCRA I 
court, “[a]s an Officer of the Court,” that he submitted 
the entire police file to Judge Franks for in camera 
review.  Munchinski App‟x 108.  He could not explain 
why the files he turned over “included none of the eleven 
pieces of exculpatory evidence at issue.”  Id.  Throughout 
the hearing, Kopas was evasive.  Kopas repeatedly 
responded to questions by stating that he could not or did 
not recall the requested information.  Judge Feudale 
noted that in contrast to his statements during the PCRA I 
hearings, Kopas‟s testimony in the PCRA III hearings 
was couched in “equivocal language.” Id. 
Finally, based on the Kinch Report‟s references to 
several articles of physical evidence that were never 
submitted for laboratory testing, the PCRA III Court 
                                                                                                             
also noted that “the comment and response was unlike 
anything [he had] perceived in [his] 15 years on the 
bench.”  Id. 
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ordered testing of all evidence still in existence.  The test 
results were inconclusive, and were matched either to the 
victims or an unidentifiable male. 
On October 1, 2004, Judge Feudale filed a 
strongly-worded 114-page opinion thoroughly analyzing 
the merits of the PCRA III petition, and granting 
Munchinski‟s petition.12  At the outset of his opinion, 
Judge Feudale remarked on the nature of the Brady 
claims in this case: 
As a general observation, in the past 
seventeen years we have presided over 
numerous PCRA petitions, both counseled 
and uncounseled.  Incantations of 
prosecutorial/police misconduct, corruption 
and perjury along with utterances of 
egregious and outrageous [sic], often 
appeared formulaic, and were ostensibly an 
elevation of form over substance.  At a 
minimum, the circumstances surrounding 
these homicides, and the subsequent events 
involving the principal cast of characters in 
                                                 
12
 Judge Feudale granted the Commonwealth leave to 
retry Munchinski if the Commonwealth produced a copy 
of the recorded statement referenced in the Goodwin 
Report within ten days of the court‟s order.  If the 
Commonwealth could not produce the recorded 
statement, Munchinski was to be released. 
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this tragic drama lend themselves to the term 
extraordinary. 
Munchinski‟s App‟x 40. 
   The PCRA III court concluded that:  (1) despite 
the PCRA I Court‟s conclusion to the contrary, the 
recorded statement referred to in the omitted paragraph 
of the Goodwin Report did exist, and was intentionally 
withheld by prosecutors; (2) even if no recorded 
statement existed, Warman‟s intentional editing of the 
Goodwin Report violated Brady; (3) Kopas intentionally 
committed prosecutorial misconduct in violation of 
Brady when he failed to turn over the entire police file, as 
ordered during the PCRA I proceedings; (4) Solomon 
and Warman both committed prosecutorial misconduct 
and numerous Brady violations leading up to and during 
the First Trial and the Retrial; and (5) Warman 
intentionally misled the jury during the Retrial when he 
stated that all Bowen received in exchange for his 
testimony was immunity, because he was aware that 
Bowen also received leniency as to a number of 
probation and parole violations in Westmoreland County.   
The PCRA III court also concluded that the 
evidence withheld by prosecutors was material under 
Brady, and granted Munchinski‟s petition.  The court 
concluded that Warman, Solomon, and Kopas all 
engaged in serious and intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Judge Feudale declined to refer the former 
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prosecutors to the Judicial Conduct Board or for possible 
criminal charges because such a referral was not “within 
the clear ambit of relief set forth in Section 9546 of the 
[PCRA].”  Munchinski App‟x 33.   
In a footnote to his order, Judge Feudale 
excoriated Warman, Solomon, and Kopas, stating that 
their “actions ill served the victims, their families, the 
defendant and citizens of Fayette County,” and 
suggesting that the outcome of the case was “a reflection 
of the ongoing foundation of prosecutorial misconduct by 
the former prosecutors.”  Munchinski App‟x 32.  Judge 
Feudale commented that in his “17 years as a judge, 
while [he has] handled numerous PCRA‟s [sic], and 
granted collateral relief, this is the first time [he has] 
granted a request for new trial/discharge.”  Id.  Judge 
Feudale closed by characterizing the matter before him as 
“an extraordinary case” and expressing the hope “that [it] 
is not replicated[.]”  Id. at 33. 
2. 
 On October 8, 2004, the Commonwealth appealed 
from the PCRA III court‟s grant of relief to Munchinski.  
On December 14, 2005, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
issued a nonprecedential and unsigned memorandum 
opinion reversing the PCRA III court.  Because the 
Superior Court‟s opinion is the focus of our review, we 
will subject it to painstaking analysis.  Unfortunately, 
though the Superior Court‟s opinion is lengthy, its 
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reasoning is opaque.  The memorandum is confusing, and 
at times internally inconsistent.  As best we can 
understand, the Superior Court concluded that certain 
articles of evidence listed in the PCRA III petition as 
undisclosed by the prosecution were not raised on a 
timely basis, and thus could not be raised as independent 
claims. Nonetheless, because some of Munchinski‟s 
claims were timely, the court concluded that it was 
required to consider all of the evidence raised in the 
PCRA III petition.  In analyzing the merits of 
Munchinski‟s Brady claims, the court considered each 
article of evidence in isolation, never considering the 
aggregate materiality of all of the withheld evidence.   
The Superior Court began its opinion with a 
discussion of the jurisdictional restrictions on courts 
reviewing a PCRA petition, noting that “Pennsylvania 
courts have no jurisdiction to address claims in an 
untimely PCRA petition no matter how serious the 
assertions raised therein[.]”  App‟x 113.  Munchinski 
argued that his petition was timely under Pennsylvania‟s 
“after-discovered evidence exception.”  App‟x 116-18; 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(2) (after-discovered 
evidence exception).  The Superior Court suggested that 
some of Munchinski‟s claims were filed beyond the 
sixty-day limitations period for after-discovered 
evidence.   
Significantly, the Court‟s analysis did not end 
there.  Up to this point in the opinion, the Superior Court 
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had not considered the articles of evidence that were 
discovered between the filing of Munchinski‟s PCRA II 
petition and his PCRA III petition.  Munchinski 
discovered a report of Sergeant George Fayouk‟s 
interview of Richard Bowen between February 20, 2003 
and March 10, 2003.  The court concluded that 
Munchinski “asserted the claims based thereon within 
sixty days of its discovery.  Thus all such claims are 
timely.”  App‟x 133.  Additionally, the court noted that 
Munchinski timely raised the Veil/Mangello Report and 
the Madden/Lucy Report.  As such, the court “agree[d] 
with the third PCRA court that Munchinski raised 
cognizable Brady claims.”  App‟x 139. 
In a critical paragraph, the Superior Court stated: 
We shall address the Commonwealth‟s 
contentions [that the alleged Brady 
violations did not concern “material” 
evidence] seriatim.  Before doing so, 
however, we must resolve the question of 
whether the procedural irregularities of this 
case preclude us from considering all of the 
evidence in the certified record.  We 
conclude that we cannot confine our analysis 
only to newly acquired evidence that was 
timely presented.  Rather, the distinction that 
must be made is whether a particular claim 
is timely and whether that claim is supported 
by sufficient evidence of record, no matter 
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when that evidence was acquired.  Because 
the PCRA‟s timing restrictions are 
jurisdictional, this Court lacks authority to 
affirm an order granting relief predicated on 
an untimely claim merely because certain 
timely presented after-discovered evidence 
tends to support that claim.  Conversely, 
however, a timely asserted claim cannot be 
found to be invalid simply because part of 
the evidence that supports the PCRA court‟s 
ruling was submitted too late to form the 
basis of an entirely separate claim.  In short, 
we cannot review the PCRA court‟s rulings 
on a diminished record.   
App‟x 148-49.   
 The Superior Court proceeded to reach the merits 
of all of the articles of evidence cited in the PCRA III 
petition, with the exception of the recorded statement 
referenced in the Goodwin Report—an issue that was 
“previously litigated” by the PCRA I court.  The Superior 
Court reiterated its conclusion that it was required to 
consider the merits as to all of the individual articles of 
evidence, including those articles that would have been 
untimely if raised separately: 
Nevertheless, the third PCRA court‟s grant 
of relief did not rely only on the eleven 
pieces of purported newly-discovered 
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evidence, which were untimely asserted.  
We must therefore discuss all of the 
evidence on which that court relied in 
granting relief.  See Santiago, 654 A.2d at 
1070 (holding that an appellate court must 
evaluate the significance of suppressed 
evidence pursuant to Brady in relation to the 
record as a whole).  As noted above, there is 
a distinction to be made between a claim 
that is untimely under the PCRA and a 
timely claim predicated on evidence that has 
been presented too late to create a separate 
issue.   
App‟x 162-63.   
 The relationship between the court‟s discussion of 
the timeliness of Munchinski‟s claims and its discussion 
of the merits of Munchinski‟s claims is unclear.  Nothing 
in the opinion suggests that the court‟s ruling on the 
merits was in the alternative.  Indeed, the opinion 
suggests the opposite—that under Pennsylvania law, the 
court was required to consider all of the evidence listed 
in Munchinski‟s petition, even if some of that evidence 
would have been untimely in a separate petition.  At all 
events, the Superior Court reversed the PCRA III court 
and dismissed the PCRA III petition.  Munchinski sought 
review from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but on 
February 8, 2007, that court denied allocatur. 
 36 
 
3. 
 On December 15, 2007, Munchinski filed the 
instant habeas petition in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The District 
Court concluded that this petition was a “second or 
successive petition” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b), and transferred jurisdiction over the case to this 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.  On November 5, 
2009, we concluded that Munchinski presented “a prima 
facie showing that his petition contain[ed] newly 
discovered evidence” as required under § 2244(b), and 
transferred jurisdiction over the petition back to the 
District Court. 
 On August 5, 2011, the Magistrate Judge to whom 
this matter was assigned issued a thorough 80-page 
opinion granting Munchinski‟s habeas petition.  Aware 
of the arguments over whether Munchinski had properly 
complied with state and federal procedural requirements, 
the District Court first considered whether Munchinski‟s 
petition was timely under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996), which requires that claims based on 
newly-discovered evidence be filed within one year of 
the discovery of that evidence.  The court found that the 
majority of the eleven articles of newly-discovered 
evidence, with the exception of the Veil/Mangello 
Report, the Madden/Lucy Report, and the Bates Report 
II, were raised beyond the one year statute of limitations 
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in § 2244(d)(1)(D).   
Though untimely, the District Court equitably 
tolled the one-year statute of limitations for the majority 
of these articles of evidence, with the exception of the 
Sava Addendum, the Parole Revocation Documents, and 
the Goodwin Report, which were discovered prior to the 
filing of the PCRA I petition.  The court reasoned that the 
uncertainty in the Pennsylvania State Courts surrounding 
parallel petitions for post-conviction relief in both state 
and federal courts was a sufficiently extraordinary 
circumstance to justify equitable tolling given “the 
general diligence exhibited by [Munchinski] throughout 
this ordeal[.]”  Commonwealth App‟x 40. 
The court then considered whether Munchinski 
had procedurally defaulted his claims.  The court appears 
to have assumed that there was procedural default.  The 
bulk of the court‟s analysis focused on whether default 
could be excused.  The court acknowledged that a 
procedural default can be excused for one of two reasons:  
(1) if a petitioner can show cause for the default and 
prejudice resulting therefrom; or (2) if enforcing the 
procedural default rule would effect a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.   
The court declined to consider whether 
Munchinski had shown cause and prejudice, because “he 
so clearly qualifies for the second exception to the 
procedural default rule—i.e., failing to allow his claims 
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to proceed would result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice.”  Commonwealth App‟x 46.  Specifically, the 
court concluded that a fundamental miscarriage of justice 
would occur because “he has show[n] by „clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.‟”  Commonwealth 
App‟x 46 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)). 
Finally, the District Court reached the merits of 
Munchinski‟s Brady claims.  The District Court 
concluded that the Superior Court unreasonably applied 
Brady in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), because the 
court analyzed the materiality of the withheld evidence 
individually, rather than collectively.  See Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995).  The court further 
concluded that Munchinski‟s new evidence demonstrated 
that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty 
under the high standard required of a habeas petitioner 
filing a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2).  The District Court granted Munchinski 
habeas relief, permitting the Commonwealth 120 days 
from the filing of its order in which it could retry 
Munchinski.  The District Court also ruled that it would 
stay its order if either party chose to appeal.  On 
September 2, 2011, the Commonwealth timely appealed. 
II. 
 The Commonwealth raises three arguments on 
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appeal:  (1) that the District Court erred by equitably 
tolling AEDPA‟s one-year statute of limitations; (2) that 
Munchinski procedurally defaulted certain claims, and 
the District Court erred by excusing the default on the 
grounds of fundamental miscarriage of justice grounds; 
and (3) that Munchinski failed to demonstrate his actual 
innocence under the high standard required by 
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court had jurisdiction 
over Munchinski‟s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241 & 2254.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 2253.  
A. 
1. 
 Under AEDPA, “[a] 1-year period of limitation 
shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court.”  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).  For a petitioner 
asserting claims based on newly-discovered evidence, the 
limitations period generally will begin to run on “the date 
on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).  AEDPA 
provides that the one-year limitation period is subject to 
“statutory tolling”: “[t]he time during which a properly 
filed application for State post-conviction or other 
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 
or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any 
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period of limitation under this subsection.”  Id. 
§ 2244(d)(2). 
 AEDPA‟s statute of limitations must be applied 
“on a claim-by-claim basis.”  Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 
113, 118 (3d Cir. 2004).  The District Court divided the 
alleged Brady violations into three separate groups based 
on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim 
. . . presented could have been discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence.”  Id. § 2244(d)(1)(D).13  For 
                                                 
13
 The District Court, citing Fielder, considered each 
article of evidence as giving rise to a separate Brady 
claim with an independent statute of limitations.  
Consequently, the District Court reasoned that certain 
Brady claims could be timely under § 2244(d), while 
other claims might well be untimely.  We agree that this 
is the correct approach when considering a petition 
alleging multiple Brady violations.  For most purposes, 
courts must analyze Brady allegations by evaluating “the 
undisclosed evidence item by item[.]”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
437 n.10.  Only after that initial item-by-item analysis do 
we “evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of 
materiality[.]”  Id.  Thus, while each alleged Brady 
violation bears on the materiality of other alleged 
violations, each violation constitutes a separate claim that 
must be analyzed independently in other respects.  As 
such, we must independently consider whether each 
alleged Brady violation is timely under § 2244(d).  
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each group, the District Court properly applied a two-step 
analysis to determine whether the claims were timely 
under § 2244(d)(1).  First, the court considered whether 
more than one year had elapsed between the date on 
which the relevant evidence could have been discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence.  If more than one 
year had elapsed, the court then considered whether the 
group of claims was entitled to statutory tolling pursuant 
to § 2244(d)(2). 
The Group 1 claims are based on the 
Veil/Mangello Report, the Madden/Lucy Report, and the 
Bates II Report.  This evidence was discovered on March 
10, 2003, while the PCRA III petition was pending.
14
  
The instant habeas petition was filed on December 15, 
2007.  More than one year lapsed from the date of 
discovery until the date Munchinski‟s habeas petition 
                                                                                                             
Because the Commonwealth has conceded that the 
Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, a point 
which appears to be beyond dispute, we do not consider 
whether, even if certain Brady violations were raised 
beyond § 2244‟s one-year statute of limitations, they can 
nonetheless be considered as part of the cumulative 
materiality analysis required by Kyles.   
 
14
 The Commonwealth has not alleged that this evidence 
“could have been discovered” any earlier, within the 
meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
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was filed, rendering the Group 1 claims untimely under 
§ 2244(d)(1).   
On April 15, 2003, however, Munchinski filed his 
PCRA III petition in Pennsylvania state court.  The 
Superior Court found that the Brady violations in Group 
1 were properly filed.  Thus, from April 15, 2003 until 
February 8, 2007, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied Munchinski‟s request for allocatur, there was a 
properly filed PCRA petition pending in the state court 
system.  As a result, Munchinski is entitled to statutory 
tolling for this period pursuant to § 2244(d)(2).  This 
means that the statute of limitations for the Group 1 
claims ran from March 10, 2003 until April 15, 2003, and 
then from February 8, 2007 until December 15, 2007.  
Cumulatively, these periods are shorter than one year.  
The Group 1 claims are therefore timely under § 2244. 
 The Group 2 claims are based on the Goodwin 
Report, the Sava Report, and the Parole Revocation 
Documents.  This evidence was discovered prior to the 
filing of Munchinski‟s PCRA I petition.  Given that we 
previously held these claims untimely in Munchinski‟s 
first habeas petition, Munchinski v. Price, 254 F.3d 1078 
(3d Cir. 2001) (unpublished), the District Court 
concluded that these claims are also untimely in the 
instant petition.  We agree, and conclude that the Group 2 
claims are untimely under § 2244(d). 
 Finally, the Group 3 claims are based on:  (1) the 
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Bates Report; (2) the Goodwin/Powell Report; (3) the 
Powell Addendum; (4) the Mangiacarne/Carbone Report; 
(5) the Dunkard/Proud Report; and (6) the Kinch Report.  
This evidence was discovered at an unspecified time in 
2000, while Munchinski‟s appeal from the denial of his 
first federal habeas petition was pending before this 
court.  The District Court concluded that the Bates 
Report was discovered on or before May 12, 2000, when 
Munchinski filed his pro se PCRA II petition referencing 
the Bates Report.  Again, well over a year elapsed 
between the discovery of the report and the filing of the 
instant habeas petition; that particular claim is thus 
untimely under § 2244(d)(1).  The court credited 
Munchinski‟s assertion that the remaining evidence in 
Group 3 was discovered between July 27, 2000 and 
August 24, 2000.  Using the July 27, 2000 date as the 
date of discovery, the Group 3 claims are also untimely 
under § 2244(d)(1).   
 Nor are the Group 3 claims entitled to statutory 
tolling under § 2244(d)(2).  The PCRA II court dismissed 
the PCRA II petition, first for being filed pro se, and 
second for lack of jurisdiction.  As such, the petition was 
never “properly filed” within the meaning of 
§ 2244(d)(2).  See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).  
Similarly, the Superior Court reviewing Munchinski‟s 
PCRA III petition concluded that the Brady allegations 
premised on the evidence in Group 3 were not raised 
within 60 days of the date of discovery, as required by 
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Pennsylvania law.
15
  As such, the PCRA III petition was 
also not “properly filed” within the meaning of 
§ 2244(d)(2).  Thus, the Group 3 claims are untimely 
under § 2244(d).  
2. 
 Though the Group 2 and 3 claims are untimely 
under § 2244(d), the Supreme Court has held that 
§ 2244(d) “is not „jurisdictional‟” and does not set forth 
“an inflexible rule requiring dismissal . . . [whenever the] 
clock has run.”  Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205, 
208 (2006).  Rather, “§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable 
tolling in appropriate cases.”  Holland v. Florida, --- U.S. 
---, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).    
The decision to equitably toll § 2244(d) “must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. at 2563 (quoting 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964)).  “In each 
case, there is a need for „flexibility,‟ „avoiding 
mechanical rules,‟ and „awareness . . . that specific 
circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could 
warrant special treatment in an appropriate case.”  Pabon 
v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563).  There are “no bright lines 
in determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a 
                                                 
15
 As we note in Part II.B, infra, the court nevertheless 
concluded for other reasons that it had to consider that 
evidence in its merits analysis. 
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given case.”  Id.  Rather, equitable tolling is appropriate 
when “principles of equity would make the rigid 
application of a limitation period unfair.”  Miller v. N.J. 
State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(alterations omitted). 
 Generally speaking, a petitioner is entitled to 
tolling if he shows: (1) “„that some extraordinary 
circumstance stood in his way‟ and prevented timely 
filing”; and (2) that “he has been pursuing his rights 
diligently.”  Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
16
  Initially, we agree with the 
                                                 
16
 It is worth noting that “a growing chorus” of our sister 
circuits have recognized “an equitable exception to 
AEDPA‟s limitation period in extraordinary cases . . . in 
which the petitioner has made a credible and compelling 
showing of his actual innocence[.]”  Rivas v. Fischer, --- 
F.3d ---, 2012 WL 2686117, at *32 (2d Cir. July 9 2012); 
see also Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665, 675 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that there is an “actual innocence” 
exception to § 2244(d)); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 
1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Lee v. Lampert, 
653 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same); 
Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(same).  But see Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868, 
871-72 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that there is no “actual 
innocence” exception to § 2244(d)); Cousin v. Lensing, 
310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); David v. Hall, 
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District Court that the Group 2 claims are not eligible for 
equitable tolling.  The parties do not object to this 
conclusion.  The Commonwealth‟s argument focuses on 
the Group 3 claims.  The District Court concluded that 
the Group 3 claims were eligible for equitable tolling 
because the PCRA II court‟s erroneous dismissal of the 
PCRA II petition constitutes an extraordinary 
circumstance, and because Munchinski diligently 
pursued his rights despite his circumstances.   
(a) 
The Commonwealth first challenges the District 
Court‟s conclusion that there were extraordinary 
circumstances that prevented Munchinski from timely 
filing the instant habeas petition.  When the facts 
allegedly constituting an extraordinary circumstance are 
not in dispute, “a District Court‟s decision on the 
question whether a case is sufficiently „extraordinary‟ to 
justify equitable tolling should be reviewed de novo.”  
                                                                                                             
318 F.3d 343, 347 (1st Cir. 2003) (same).  Because we 
conclude that Munchinski has shown diligence and 
extraordinary circumstances, however, we agree with the 
District Court that he is entitled to equitable tolling on 
that basis.  We thus do not consider whether an “actual 
innocence” exception to § 2244(d) exists. 
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Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2005).
17
 
The extraordinary circumstances prong requires 
that the petitioner “in some extraordinary way be[ ] 
prevented from asserting his or her rights.”  Brown v. 
Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2003).  “One . . . 
potentially extraordinary situation is where a court has 
misled a party regarding the steps that the party needs to 
take to preserve a claim.”  Brinson, 398 F.3d at 230.  
That is precisely what happened here.  The facts before 
us are remarkably similar to those in Urcinoli v. Cathel, 
546 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 2008).  In both cases, a court 
erroneously dismissed pending petitions amidst 
confusion over recent caselaw.  In both cases, the court 
implicitly suggested steps that the petitioner should take 
to present the same claims in the future.  In Urcinoli, the 
court dismissed a so-called “mixed” habeas petition 
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and 
implicitly suggested that the petitioner refile the same 
petition without the allegedly unexhausted claims.  As we 
noted, however, if the petitioner refiled the petition, those 
claims would have been untimely because the one-year 
limitation in § 2244(d) had already passed.  Id.  So too 
                                                 
17
 Brinson suggested that a de novo standard of review 
should apply, but declined to decide the issue.  In Taylor 
v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427 (3d Cir. 2007), however, we 
applied a de novo standard, and implicitly adopted 
Brinson. 
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here, the PCRA II court erroneously dismissed the PCRA 
II petition for lack of jurisdiction because of 
Munchinski‟s pending federal appeal.  In so doing, the 
court implied that Munchinski could reassert his claims 
once the federal appeal was resolved.  Munchinski did 
precisely that, but the Superior Court concluded that such 
claims had become untimely.   
We thus conclude, as we did in Urcinoli, that the 
PCRA II court‟s dismissal of Munchinski‟s pending 
petition, with its implicit suggestion that Munchinski 
refile once his federal appeal was resolved, was 
sufficiently misleading as to constitute an extraordinary 
circumstance because “it later operate[d] to prevent 
[Munchinski] from pursuing his rights.”  Id. at 275. 
(b) 
 The diligence required of a habeas petitioner 
seeking equitable tolling “is reasonable diligence, not 
maximum feasible diligence.”  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 
2565 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
The Commonwealth argues that by failing to appeal the 
PCRA II court‟s erroneous dismissal of his petition, 
Munchinski did not demonstrate the “reasonable 
diligence” necessary to permit equitable tolling.   
We have not addressed the appropriate standard of 
review for a District Court‟s determination that a habeas 
petitioner demonstrated reasonable diligence.  Whether a 
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petitioner‟s diligence was “reasonable” under the 
circumstances of the case seems a much more fact-
intensive inquiry than whether a set of undisputed facts 
constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” as a matter 
of law.  As such, Brinson‟s reasons for de novo review of 
a district court‟s extraordinary circumstances analysis 
may not apply to its diligence analysis in all cases.  See, 
e.g., Rivas v. Fischer, --- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 2686117, at 
*21 (2d Cir. July 9, 2012) (reviewing district court‟s 
diligence analysis for clear error).  Indeed, when 
reviewing a district court‟s determination that a petitioner 
demonstrated “reasonable diligence in the circumstances” 
under § 2244(d)(1)(D), we apply a clear error standard.  
Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 660-61 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We need not decide this issue, however, because we 
conclude that Munchinski demonstrated reasonable 
diligence even under a de novo standard. 
The diligence requirement “does not demand a 
showing that the petitioner left no stone unturned.”  
Ramos-Martinez v. United States, 638 F.3d 315, 324 (1st 
Cir. 2011).  Rather, “[t]o determine if a petitioner has 
been [reasonably] diligent in pursuing his petition, courts 
consider the petitioner‟s overall level of care and caution 
in light of his or her particular circumstances.”  Doe v. 
Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1013 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 
Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Due diligence . . . require[s] reasonable diligence in the 
circumstances.”).    In other words, the diligence inquiry 
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is fact-specific and depends on the circumstances faced 
by the particular petitioner; there are no bright line rules 
as to what conduct is insufficient to constitute reasonable 
diligence.  If a petitioner “did what he reasonably thought 
was necessary to preserve his rights . . . based on 
information he received . . . , then he can hardly be 
faulted for not acting more „diligently‟ than he did.”  
Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 65 (1st Cir. 2012). 
Over the past several decades, Munchinski has 
vigorously pursued relief in state and federal courts.  He 
has filed five petitions for post-conviction relief, all 
raising substantial and difficult questions about his 
conviction.  He filed the PCRA II petition very soon after 
discovering the Bates Report, though the petition was 
mistakenly dismissed by the court.  He followed the 
PCRA II court‟s implicit suggestion and filed his PCRA 
III petition within a month of our dismissal of the 
Appeal, when the alleged jurisdictional issue had been 
resolved.  Throughout this process, he continued to 
collect evidence.  He presented this evidence in his 
PCRA III petition—if the PCRA II court had been 
correct about the jurisdictional issue, this evidence would 
have been timely presented under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9545(b)(2).  Under the circumstances, we conclude that 
Munchinski was reasonably diligent. 
Munchinski‟s conduct is comparable to that of the 
petitioner in Mathis v. Thaler, 616 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 
2010).  In that case, the petitioner was simultaneously 
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pursuing post-conviction relief in state and federal courts.  
Just like  the PCRA II court, the state court erroneously 
dismissed the pending state court petition based on its 
understanding of Texas‟s so-called “two-forum rule,” 
which prohibited state courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over a state court petition while a federal petition was 
pending.  The Texas state courts subsequently clarified 
the two-forum rule in Ex parte Soffar, 143 S.W. 3d 804, 
807 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 2004), permitting review of a 
state court petition if the federal petition was stayed.   
Soon after the Soffar decision, the petitioner again 
sought relief in the state courts.  The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the petitioner “exhibited a pattern of 
diligently pursuing his rights in state and federal court, 
despite procedural difficulties. . . .  Far from sleeping on 
his rights, [the petitioner] sought relief in multiple 
tribunals in an effort to raise his . . . claim.  Under the 
circumstances, [the petitioner‟s] actions were more than 
reasonably diligent.”  Mathis, 616 F.3d at 474.  We reach 
the same conclusion here, and agree with the District 
Court that in view of the extraordinarily difficult 
circumstances that Munchinski faced, he demonstrated 
reasonable diligence in pursuing his rights. 
The Commonwealth argues that Munchinski‟s 
failure to appeal from the PCRA II court‟s dismissal of 
his petition precludes him from showing reasonable 
diligence.  We disagree.  Although with the benefit of 
hindsight, an appeal may have been prudent, equitable 
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tolling does not require the “maximum feasible 
diligence.”  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565.  What the 
diligence inquiry requires is reasonable diligence under 
the circumstances of a particular case.   
The PCRA II court interpreted Pennsylvania state 
law as precluding jurisdiction over a PCRA petition 
while Munchinski‟s federal appeal remained pending.  
As the District Court noted, at that time the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had yet to issue its ruling in 
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2003), 
which clarified that Pennsylvania state courts do maintain 
jurisdiction over a PCRA petition despite a pending 
federal petition.  As such, when the PCRA II court 
dismissed Munchinski‟s petition, it was not clear that the 
court had erred.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s case 
law could be read (as it was by the PCRA II court) to 
disclaim jurisdiction over a PCRA petition while a 
federal petition was pending.  There then existed no case 
law that might clearly indicate to Munchinski that the 
PCRA II court had erred.  Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the issue, we do not think it was 
unreasonable for Munchinski to choose to credit the 
PCRA II court‟s interpretation of Pennsylvania 
procedural law, and heed its implicit suggestion that he 
wait to refile his claims once this court resolved his 
federal appeal.   
As we have observed, the diligence inquiry is 
contextual.  Here, Munchinski made almost every effort 
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to seek timely post-conviction relief in both the state and 
federal systems.  He simply chose to follow the implicit 
suggestion from the PCRA II court rather than appeal its 
decision.  He did not “sleep[ ] on his rights.”  Mathis, 616 
F.3d at 474.  Nor did he simply misread a court opinion.  
See Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(holding that “misreading a court opinion” was not a 
sufficient basis to permit equitable tolling).  He did 
exactly what the PCRA II court implicitly suggested, 
doing “what he reasonably thought was necessary to 
preserve his rights . . . based on information he 
received[.]”  Holmes, 685 F.3d at 65.  Under these 
circumstances, the “principles of equity would make the 
rigid application of a limitation period unfair.”  Miller, 
145 F.3d at 618 (alterations omitted).  We thus conclude 
that Munchinski was reasonably diligent under the 
circumstances in pursuing his rights. 
Because we conclude that Munchinski faced 
extraordinary circumstances and demonstrated 
reasonable diligence in pursuit of his rights, we agree 
with the District Court that he is entitled to equitable 
tolling.  The District Court was correct in deciding to toll 
the statute of limitations as to his Group 3 claims from 
August 24, 2000, when Munchinski‟s PCRA II petition 
was dismissed,
18
 until February 8, 2007, when the 
                                                 
18
 It is unclear why the District Court only tolled § 2244 
starting on August 24, 2000, when his PCRA II petition 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur over the 
Superior Court‟s dismissal of his PCRA III petition.  
With this period equitably tolled, Munchinski‟s Group 3 
claims, with the exception of his claim based on the 
Bates Report, are timely.  As such, the District Court 
could properly consider the Group 1 and Group 3 claims, 
again with the exception of the claim based on the Bates 
Report.  
B. 
Even if a claim is timely under § 2244, a federal 
court “may not conduct habeas corpus review of a claim 
which a petitioner has procedurally defaulted in state 
court.”  Lark v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 645 F.3d 596, 
611 (3d Cir. 2011).  Grounded in principles of comity 
and federalism, the procedural default doctrine prevents a 
federal court sitting in habeas from reviewing a state 
                                                                                                             
was dismissed, as opposed to July 27, 2000, when the 
PCRA II petition was filed.  Certainly, the alleged 
extraordinary circumstance here, the PCRA II court‟s 
erroneous dismissal of Munchinski‟s petition along with 
the suggestion that Munchinski wait to refile his petition 
once the Appeal was resolved, did not occur until August 
24, 2000.  But for this circumstance, the PCRA II petition 
may well have been “properly filed, and Munchinski may 
have been entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2).  
Munchinski has not raised this argument on appeal, 
however, and it does not affect our judgment. 
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court decision that rests on a state law ground “that is 
sufficient to support the judgment,” when that state law 
ground “is independent of the federal question and 
adequate to support the judgment.”  Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991).  In such situations, 
“resolution of any independent federal ground for the 
decision could not affect the judgment and would 
therefore be advisory.”  Id. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Coleman, “[i]t is 
not always easy for a federal court to apply the 
[procedural default] doctrine.  State court opinions will, 
at times, discuss federal questions at length and mention 
a state law basis for decision only briefly.”  Id. at 732.  A 
state court can still “look to federal law for guidance or 
as an alternative holding while still relying on an 
independent and adequate state ground” as long as it 
states “„clearly and expressly that [its decision] is . . . 
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent 
grounds.‟”  Id. at 733 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)).  In certain situations, however, 
it may be “difficult to determine if the state law 
discussion is truly an independent basis for decision[,]” 
and thus whether there has been a procedural default.  Id. 
at 732.   
To account for this difficulty, the Supreme Court 
has instructed federal courts to “presume that there is no 
independent and adequate state ground for a court 
decision . . . when the adequacy and independence of any 
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possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the 
opinion.  Id. at 735 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In order to overcome this presumption, “the 
last state court to which the petitioner presented his 
federal claims . . . [must] clearly and expressly rely on an 
independent and adequate state ground[.]”  Id.   
The District Court held that Munchinski 
procedurally defaulted his Group 3 claims.  The court 
concluded that the Superior Court relied on an 
independent and adequate state law ground, namely the 
sixty-day statute of limitations in § 9545(b)(2), to dismiss 
the Group 3 claims.  Only then did the court consider 
whether or not to excuse the procedural default, 
ultimately excusing the default on fundamental 
miscarriage of justice grounds.  We do not reach the 
latter question because we disagree with the District 
Court as to the former; we conclude that the Superior 
Court did not “clearly and expressly” rely on a state law 
ground sufficient to support its judgment, and thus that 
there was no procedural default. 
The Commonwealth argues that there was in fact a 
procedural default, and directs us to the portions of the 
opinion discussing the timeliness of the Group 3 claims.  
See Commonwealth App‟x 117-23.  Admittedly, there is 
language in the court‟s opinion suggesting that these 
claims, considered in isolation, are untimely under 
§ 9545(b)(2).  But the opinion immediately follows that 
discussion with the disclaimer that its “analysis does not 
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end here, however.”  Id. at 123.   
The remainder of the Superior Court‟s opinion is 
difficult to understand, and at times seems almost self-
contradictory.  The Superior Court apparently concluded 
that the Group 3 claims were “submitted too late to form 
the basis of an entirely separate claim.” Id. at 149.  
Nonetheless, “a timely asserted claim cannot be found to 
be invalid simply because part of the evidence that 
supports the PCRA court‟s ruling was submitted too late 
to form the basis of an entirely separate claim.”  Id.  
Consequently, the court concluded that it could not 
“review the PCRA court‟s rulings on a diminished 
record[,]” and reached the merits of all of Munchinski‟s 
Brady claims.  Id. 
In other words, the court concluded that even 
though the Group 2 and Group 3 claims were untimely if 
presented independently, it was required to consider the 
materiality of all of the alleged suppressed evidence 
because Munchinski did present timely Brady claims via 
Group 1.  Though the Superior Court does not explain 
why it was required to reach the merits as to all of 
Munchinski‟s Brady claims, it cites a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case to support its conclusion.  As such, 
this conclusion appears to result from an interpretation of 
state law, and is not properly before us.  The only issue 
we must consider is whether the Superior Court‟s earlier 
statements regarding the Group 2 and 3 claims provide an 
independent and adequate state court ground sufficient to 
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support its judgment.   
The Superior Court concluded that despite “the 
procedural irregularities of this case,” it was required to 
address the federal question as to all of Munchinski‟s 
Brady claims.  The court could not then have relied 
exclusively on its procedural rulings to resolve the Group 
2 and Group 3 claims.  Indeed, the court repeats several 
times, using mandatory language, that it was required to 
reach the merits of all of Munchinski‟s claims, stating:  
(1) that it “cannot confine [its] analysis only to newly 
acquired evidence that was timely presented,” Id. at 148; 
(2) that “a timely asserted claim cannot be found to be 
invalid simply because part of the evidence that supports 
the PCRA court‟s ruling was submitted too late to form 
the basis of an entirely separate claim,” Id. at 149; (3) 
that it “cannot review the PCRA court‟s ruling on a 
diminished record,” Id.; and (4) that it “must therefore 
discuss all of the evidence on which that court relied on 
granting relief,” Id. at 162.   
Despite Munchinski‟s procedural error, the 
Superior Court concluded that it was required to consider 
the materiality of all of the evidence raised in the PCRA 
III petition.   Logically speaking, the procedural ruling 
was not sufficient to support the court‟s judgment.  That 
is, the court could not avoid analyzing the merits of 
Munchinski‟s Group 3 claims on the basis of their 
timeliness.  Indeed, the court specifically rejected that 
possibility.  See id. at 148 (“We conclude that we cannot 
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confine our analysis only to newly acquired evidence that 
was timely presented [under § 9545(b)(2)].” (emphasis 
added)). 
This is not a case where addressing “any 
independent federal ground for the decision could not 
affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.”  
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729.  Munchinski‟s habeas petition 
was directed at the Superior Court‟s Brady analysis of the 
Group 1 and Group 3 claims—an analysis implicating 
federal law that the Superior Court apparently believed it 
was required to conduct.  If we disagree with the 
Superior Court‟s application of federal law, and we do, 
the Superior Court‟s judgment cannot be sustained.  See 
Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 336-37 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that there was no procedural default even 
though a petition was possibly untimely, because the 
procedural error was not sufficient to support the state 
court‟s judgment; the state court determined that it was 
“bound under Pennsylvania law to reach the merits” 
despite any procedural error).  As such, federalism and 
comity do not prevent us from considering the evidence 
giving rise to the Group 3 claims. 
When pressed on this point at argument, the 
Commonwealth argued that the Court‟s discussion of the 
federal issues were simply alternative grounds for its 
judgment.  To be sure, a state court can speak to a federal 
issue in the alternative, so long as it is clear from the face 
of the opinion that the state law ruling is sufficient to 
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support its judgment.  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 733.  
Here, however, the state law ruling was not sufficient to 
support its judgment—the court‟s Brady analysis was 
necessary to its holding.  An issue that is necessary to the 
court‟s judgment cannot be “an alternative basis” for the 
ruling.  Without the analysis of federal law, the Superior 
Court could not have reached the conclusion that it 
reached. 
Even if it were possible to read the discussion of 
federal law as an alternative basis for the court‟s holding, 
we do not think that the opinion is sufficiently clear to 
overcome the presumption against procedural default.  
The Superior Court did not “clearly and expressly” rely 
on state procedural law as grounds for its judgment.  As 
stated above, there is language in the opinion suggesting 
that Munchinski‟s procedural error was not a sufficient 
basis to support its judgment.  The Superior Court did not 
indicate that its discussion of federal law was merely an 
alternative basis for its holding.  Because “the adequacy 
and independence of any possible state law ground is not 
clear from the face of the opinion,” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 
735, we conclude that the District Court erred by 
concluding that Munchinski‟s Group 3 claims were 
procedurally defaulted.  Absent any procedural default, 
the District Court did not err when it included the Group 
3 claims in its merits analysis. 
C. 
 61 
 
Because the instant habeas petition is a second or 
successive petition, Munchinski must also demonstrate 
“by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have 
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).  Other courts have referred to 
this statute as requiring a “gateway” showing of actual 
innocence.  See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 641 
F.3d 596, 611-12 (4th Cir. 2011). 
1. 
 The Commonwealth argues that Munchinski has 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable juror could vote to convict him in light of his 
newly-discovered evidence.  We generally review the 
District Court‟s “probability determination that no 
reasonable juror would convict de novo.”  Gomez v. 
Jaimet, 350 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2003); see also 
Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 At the Retrial, the Commonwealth built an 
elaborate theory of the case.  It argued that the murders 
were drug related—that Munchinski, Scaglione, and 
Bowen drove to Gierke‟s cabin in a lime green Gran 
Torino in order to resolve a drug dispute.  The 
Commonwealth presented a straightforward timeline of 
events, arguing that over the course of a few hours that 
night, Scaglione raped Gierke, Munchinski raped Alford, 
and then almost immediately afterwards, Gierke and 
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Alford were shot.  The Commonwealth‟s theory was 
supported exclusively by Bowen‟s testimony.  Indeed, 
the Commonwealth concedes as much in its briefing 
before this court.  See Commonwealth Br. 41 
(“Appellants acknowledge that Bowen‟s testimony was 
central to the prosecution case.”). 
We acknowledge that mere impeachment evidence 
is generally not sufficient to show actual innocence by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Cf. Sawyer v. Whitley, 
505 U.S. 333, 349 (1992).  Munchinski‟s newly-
discovered evidence, however, is not mere impeachment 
evidence.  Rather, Munchinski‟s evidence clearly and 
convincingly shows that the murders could not have 
happened as the Commonwealth proposed at trial.  See 
Keith v. Bobby, 551 F.3d 555, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(differentiating between habeas petitions premised on 
mere impeachment evidence, and petitions based on 
“new evidence that . . . directly contradicted the 
government‟s case in chief”).  The Powell Report and the 
Goodwin/Powell Report both suggest that the 
Commonwealth‟s timeline is inconsistent with the 
physical evidence from the autopsy.
19
  The Bates Report 
                                                 
19
 The Commonwealth points to credibility issues 
concerning some of the new evidence that Munchinski 
raises in his habeas petition, arguing that Munchinski 
cannot surpass § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)‟s high standard when 
his proffered evidence has credibility problems.  
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II suggests that Bowen, the only witness who could 
provide any details supporting the Commonwealth‟s 
theory of the case, was not even in Pennsylvania the 
night of the murders, and makes clear that the police 
were aware of this fact.   
Besides Bowen‟s testimony, the only evidence 
linking Munchinski to the murders was (1) testimony 
from Lexa, Dahlmann, and Furr, three acquaintances who 
                                                                                                             
Certainly, when analyzing the record for actual 
innocence purposes, “the court must give due regard to 
any unreliability of the evidence, and may have to make 
some credibility assessments[.]”  MacDonald, 641 F.3d 
at 612-13 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  There are minor credibility issues with some of 
Munchinski‟s evidence.  For example, Powell claimed at 
the PCRA III hearings that he never stated that the rapes 
occurred at least 24 hours prior to the murders.  The task 
of weighing the credibility of Munchinski‟s new 
evidence, however, would ultimately lie with the jury.  
The jury would have to determine whether to credit 
Powell‟s PCRA testimony, over two decades after the 
initial autopsy, or two statements made soon after the 
autopsies, and recorded by police officers with no 
motivation to misstate the facts.  Our role is not to weigh 
the credibility of each witness; rather, we must consider 
all of the relevant evidence and account for any 
credibility issues in our analysis. 
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testified that Munchinski confessed to them in a bar in 
January 1978; and (2) testimony from Thomas, a 
jailhouse informant who claimed that Munchinski 
confessed to him in jail.  The Mangiacarne/Carbone 
Report provided the jury evidence that Dahlmann, Lexa, 
and Furr had a motivation to fabricate Munchinski‟s 
supposed confession, to keep Dahlmann‟s ex-husband 
Wiltrout from being implicated in the crime.  While 
Munchinski was aware that Wiltrout was a suspect in the 
murders early in the investigation, he could not 
effectively cross-examine Dahlmann, Lexa, and Furr 
about Wiltrout absent any evidence that Wiltrout was a 
serious subject of the investigation.  The 
Mangiacarne/Carbone Report would have made clear to 
the jury that if the murders were not attributed to 
Munchinski, Wiltrout would be high on the list of 
potential suspects. 
Again, the Mangiacarne/Carbone Report does 
more than just impeach Dahlmann, Lexa, and Furr.  The 
report presents an alternative theory that better fits the 
verifiable facts of the case than the Commonwealth‟s 
theory.  Carbone‟s account suggested that Wiltrout and at 
least one acquaintance travelled to Bear Rocks for a drug 
deal.  At some point, the drug deal went bad and Wiltrout 
shot Alford and Gierke.  Commonwealth App‟x 220.  
There was no inconsistency between this account and 
Powell‟s statements concerning the timing of the rapes. 
The fact that Carbone‟s account supported a theory of the 
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case that better fit with other recovered evidence is a 
critical point.  In House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), the 
Supreme Court found that the petitioner made a gateway 
showing of actual innocence in part because the 
petitioner‟s newly-discovered evidence identified an 
alternate suspect and supported a more appropriate theory 
of the case.  See id. at 548-53.  
The Commonwealth would essentially be asking 
the jury to convict based on:  (1) an implausible theory of 
the case inconsistent with other evidence in the record; 
(2) self-serving testimony from three acquaintances 
whose testimony kept Dahlmann‟s ex-husband from 
becoming a target in the investigation; and (3) testimony 
from a jailhouse informant. Critically, the jury would be 
left without a theory of the case to explain the actual 
murder itself—testimony from Dahlmann, Lexa, Furr, 
and Thomas was limited to what happened after the 
murders, and did not provide the jury with a detailed 
account of what actually transpired in Bear Rocks. 
On the other hand, Munchinski would have offered 
the jury alternative theories of the case without the 
problematic inconsistencies in Bowen‟s account.  
Considering all of the evidence that would have been 
presented to the jury, Munchinski has clearly and 
convincingly demonstrated that but for the 
Commonwealth‟s Brady violations, no reasonable juror 
could rationally believe beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Munchinski committed the Bear Rocks Murders.   
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The Commonwealth‟s case against Munchinski 
was always close, even without the critical pieces of 
evidence that the Commonwealth unlawfully suppressed.  
When the jury at the First Trial was presented with 
virtually the same evidence, they could not reach a 
verdict.  Giving “due regard to any unreliability of” 
Munchinski‟s new evidence, we are satisfied that 
Munchinski has made a truly persuasive demonstration of 
his “actual innocence.”  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
328 (1995).  When all of the evidence is considered as a 
whole, we are convinced that no reasonable juror could 
rationally vote to convict.  We thus conclude that 
Munchinski has made a gateway showing of actual 
innocence, under the clear and convincing evidence 
standard required under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
2. 
 The Commonwealth also argues that Munchinski 
has not “support[ed] his allegations of constitutional error 
with new reliable evidence.”  Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.  
The Commonwealth concedes that Munchinski has 
presented “new” evidence, but argues that Munchinski‟s 
evidence is not “reliable” within the meaning of Schlup.  
Commonwealth Br. at 36 (“Although Munchinski 
presented new evidence, nothing about this evidence 
indicates that it is particularly reliable.”).  We review de 
novo whether a petitioner‟s evidence is sufficient to 
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satisfy Schlup.  See McCoy v. Norris, 125 F.3d 1186, 
1190 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Sweger, 294 F.3d at 522.
20
 
In Schlup, the Supreme Court emphasized that a 
petitioner asserting actual innocence in a second or 
successive habeas petition based on newly-discovered 
                                                 
20
 We have not had occasion in this circuit to definitively 
determine whether § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) incorporates all of 
the “features of the standards spelled out in [ ] pre-
AEDPA decisions . . . [that] oblige[ ] the prisoner to 
proffer some new evidence in support of his habeas 
corpus claim.”  MacDonald, 641 F.3d at 612.  We have 
previously held that AEDPA “built on,” rather than 
supplanted, the “abuse-of-the-writ” doctrine that 
preceded AEDPA.  See Goldblum v. Klem, 510 F.3d 204, 
216 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2007).  Though Goldblum does not 
explicitly resolve the question at issue here—
whether§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) incorporates Schlup‟s 
requirement of new and reliable evidence—it does 
suggest that AEDPA did nothing to displace that 
requirement from Schlup.  Consequently, we are inclined 
to agree with the Fourth Circuit that § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
incorporates Schlup, and that a petitioner filing a second 
or successive petition must provide new and reliable 
evidence in support of his or her claims.  See 
MacDonald, 641 F.3d at 612.  Because this issue has not 
been briefed by the parties, however, we will not address 
it here.  
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evidence must rely on “reliable evidence-whether it be 
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 
accounts, or critical physical evidence[.]”  Schlup, 513 
U.S. at 324.  The Commonwealth argues that because all 
of Munchinski‟s evidence merely attacks Bowen‟s 
credibility, his evidence does not fit within the categories 
of permissible evidence cited in Schlup, and thus cannot 
be “reliable.” 
 Schlup‟s three categories are not an exhaustive list 
of the types of evidence that can be “reliable.”  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court‟s own decision in House, 547 U.S. at 
548-53, suggests that other types of evidence can pass the 
high bar set by Schlup.  In House, the Supreme Court 
spent a large portion of its analysis on evidence that 
implicated another suspect.  Id.  This evidence is very 
similar to the evidence raised by Munchinski—the 
petitioner‟s evidence implicates other suspects and casts 
serious doubts on the viability of the Commonwealth‟s 
theory of the case.  Moreover, Munchinski has presented 
evidence that is reliable under Schlup.  The Powell 
Report and the Goodwin/Powell Report are “exculpatory 
scientific evidence” because both suggest that Alford had 
been raped “at least 24 hours prior” to his death.   
When pressed about these two articles of evidence 
at oral argument, the Commonwealth argued that even 
though they might appear to be reliable, they are in fact 
not reliable because they conflicted with Powell‟s 
testimony during the PCRA proceedings.  The 
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Commonwealth argued that because Powell later 
disavowed the claims in the Powell Report and the 
Goodwin/Powell Report, that those reports cannot be 
reliable.  Schlup, however, does not require a habeas 
court to play the role of the jury and weigh all potentially 
countervailing evidence when considering whether a 
particular article of evidence is reliable.  That weighing 
exercise is undertaken when the court considers whether 
any reasonable juror would vote to convict based on all 
of the evidence in the record.  We conclude that the 
Goodwin/Powell Report and the Powell Report are 
“reliable,” within the meaning of Schlup.   
Similarly, the Bates Report II and the 
Dunkard/Proud Report are “reliable” evidence within the 
meaning of Schlup.  The former is a police report relating 
an interview of someone with direct personal knowledge 
of Bowen‟s whereabouts.  The latter is a police report 
relating an interview with a police dispatcher.  Although 
neither is a sworn affidavit, both reports document what 
were, at the time, non-controversial facts that were 
recorded by the police themselves.  We believe that the 
particular context surrounding these reports sufficiently 
guarantee their reliability in this case.  Nothing in the 
record suggests that either the police or the declarants 
had any reason to misstate the facts in either of these 
reports at the time the reports were created.   
The Commonwealth is correct that mere 
impeachment evidence is generally not sufficient to 
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satisfy the Schlup standard.  See Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 349.  
But like the Powell Report and the Goodwin/Powell 
Report, both the Bates Report II and the Dunkard/Proud 
Report are not merely impeachment evidence.  As such, 
they call into question the Commonwealth‟s entire theory 
of the case.  Indeed, the prosecution appears to have 
recognized this, by highlighting the portion of the Bates 
Report II suggesting that Bowen had left for Oklahoma 
prior to the murders.  Munchinski provides the type of 
evidence required of a second or successive petition 
under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).   
Based on all of this evidence, we conclude that 
Munchinski has “present[ed] new, reliable evidence that 
was not presented at trial.”  Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 
88, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  Assuming that 
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) incorporates Schlup‟s requirement 
that a petitioner support his or her constitutional claims 
with new and reliable evidence, we are thus satisfied that 
Munchinski has presented evidence that satisfied 
Schlup‟s high standard. 
III. 
 The Commonwealth restricted its appeal to three 
issues:  (1) whether the District Court erred by equitably 
tolling the statute of limitations for Munchinski‟s Group 
3 claims; (2) whether the District Court erred by excusing 
the procedural default of his Group 3 claims; and (3) 
whether Munchinski has made a gateway showing of 
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actual innocence under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).  We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court, although we 
depart from its reasoning.  See Ross v. Dist. Att’y of the 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 672 F.3d 198, 213 n.12 (3d Cir. 
2012) (noting that we can affirm on an alternative basis).   
First, we agree with the District Court that 
Munchinski was entitled to equitable tolling for his 
Group 3 claims.  Second, we conclude that Munchinski 
did not procedurally default his claims, and thus that 
there was no need to decide whether to excuse his alleged 
default.  Finally, we conclude that Munchinski has 
shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that no 
reasonable juror would vote to convict him based on all 
of the evidence that should have been introduced at trial, 
absent the Commonwealth‟s constitutional violations.  
We also conclude that Munchinski has introduced new 
and reliable evidence in support of the constitutional 
claims in his second or successive petition.  We 
acknowledge that both the Supreme Court and Congress 
have set a high standard for second or successive habeas 
petitions that “permits review only in the „extraordinary‟ 
case.”  House, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).  
“Extraordinary” is how Judge Feudale characterized this 
case when it was before him at the PCRA III stage, and 
“extraordinary” is how we view it for second or 
successive habeas purposes. 
Though our reasoning differs from that of the 
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District Court, we ultimately agree with that court that 
the procedural irregularities of this case do not preclude 
us from reaching the merits of Munchinski‟s argument 
that the Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady as to 
his Group 1 and Group 3 claims—an argument that has 
been expressly and rightly conceded by the 
Commonwealth.  It seems that the Commonwealth‟s 
decision to appeal the District Court‟s judgment may 
have been motivated by considerations external to this 
particular case, because it is difficult to discern any 
significant justification on this record for continuing to 
defend what is now acknowledged by all to be a badly 
tainted and highly suspect conviction.  We will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court granting Munchinski a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254(d)(1).  The 
Commonwealth must either release Munchinski or retry 
him within 120 days of our opinion. 
 
